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The Biological and Toxin Weapons Conven-
tion (1) prohibits the development, production,
stockpiling, or transfer of biological weapons
agents (microbial pathogens and toxins) for other
than peaceful purposes and any devices used to
deliver these agents.1 The convention was the
first treaty to outlaw the development and
possession of an entire category of weapons, and
the first to outlaw any weapon of mass
destruction. There are now 143 states parties to
the convention and an additional 18 signatories.
Even though the convention’s renunciation of
biological and toxin weapons was categorical, it
was not accompanied by effective provisions for
verification. Article VI of the convention provides
that states parties that suspect another state
party of noncompliance may submit a complaint
to the U.N. Security Council, and all states
parties are obliged to cooperate fully with any
investigation that the security council may
initiate. However, this mechanism has proved
inadequate. Despite several allegations of
noncompliance in the 25 years the treaty has
been in force, Article VI has never been invoked,
probably in recognition of the intensely political
nature of security council decisions, and the
crippling effect of the veto power of the five
permanent members (2,3).
Recent information about the covert biologi-
cal weapons programs of the former Soviet Union
(4) and Iraq (5) gave added momentum to
verification efforts begun in 1991. A draft text for
a protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention is now in the final stages of
development and could be opened for signature
and ratification within a year. One of the
provisions of this >200-page protocol will be a
mechanism for investigating certain outbreaks of
disease to resolve suspicions about compliance
with the convention (6). There are several
reasons for having such a mechanism (7). An
outbreak of disease might be the result of
biological attack on troops, civilians, crop
plants, or domestic animals. Alternatively, an
outbreak could be the result of accidental
escape of harmful agents from a secret
biological weapons facility. A mechanism for
the prompt investigation of such outbreaks by
the international community would address
and resolve such concerns; it would also deter the
use of unsubstantiated accusations (e.g., the 1952
allegation of U.S. propaganda use of biological
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agents in Korea and Manchuria [8,9]) and
would reduce the credibility of fraudulent
investigations controlled by the accuser.
Finally, the political costs of being identified as
a biological aggressor could deter covert
biological weapons programs (7,10).
What Outbreaks Will Be Investigated?
Thousands of outbreaks of disease occur
annually among humans, domestic animals, crop
plants, and wild animals and plants. The only
outbreaks relevant to the weapons convention
and its verification protocol are “suspicious”
outbreaks, which have features suggesting an
unnatural cause. The draft protocol calls for
requests to investigate outbreaks to include
“detailed evidence, and other information, and
analysis that such an outbreak(s) of disease is not
naturally occurring and is directly related to
activities prohibited by the Convention” (6).
Thus, very few outbreaks would likely become
issues of treaty compliance.
An outbreak might be suspicious because
epidemiologic features suggest an unnatural
origin. For example, in the 1979 anthrax
outbreak in Sverdlovsk, former Soviet Union, the
distribution of both human and animal cases in a
narrow corridor downwind from a military
microbiology facility was a strong indication of
unnatural origin (11,12). Also, the etiologic agent
may differ from agents naturally found in the
environment, as would be the case if the agent
were genetically engineered; in such an event,
the unusual phenotype of the agent would signal
something anomalous. Detailed molecular study,
including DNA sequencing, should reveal the
recombinant nature of the organism.
Even in the absence of genetic engineering,
agents used as biological weapons may differ in
recognizable ways from those causing natural
cases of the same disease. This would be the case
if the weapons agent had been maintained in
laboratory culture for some time before use.
Because of natural selection and genetic drift,
each population of an organism continually
diverges genetically from others of the same
organism. It is thus possible in principle (and in
practice for many agents) to determine the
geographic origin of an outbreak with the tools of
molecular epidemiology, by determining to which
local population its etiologic agent belongs. An
outbreak caused by a strain last seen many years
ago could be suspicious (7,10).
Other features of the agent can also be
suspicious. For instance, in the Sverdlovsk
outbreak, retrospective molecular analysis of
retained pathology samples showed that patients
appeared to have been simultaneously infected
with several strains of the anthrax agent (13);
multiple infections are not normally encountered
in natural outbreaks.
In addition to unusual epidemiologic fea-
tures, devices used to disseminate the agent and
intelligence information can help identify a
suspicious outbreak. For example, the 1993
outbreak of intestinal illness among the
insurgent Karen of Burma (Myanmar) (14-16)
was suspicious largely because a number of
putative delivery devices (balloons attached to
meteorologic radiosondes and parachutes) were
recovered.
Labeling an outbreak suspicious reflects a
judgment that the evidence suggests unnatural
causes. Different analysts can come to different
conclusions, and political or ideological factors
can affect the judgment. Thus, compiling a list of
features that would automatically render an
outbreak suspicious is not possible. Probably,
most or all suspicious outbreaks will turn out to
be natural occurrences.
Types of Suspicious Outbreaks
Suspicious outbreaks can be grouped into
four main categories, depending on the nature of
the suspicions they provoke. They may be
thought to be the result of covert biological attack
by another nation, criminal or terrorist attack,
covert attack by a nation on a subnational group
within its borders, or escape of a biological agent
from a facility developing prohibited weapons.
If a nation suspects it has been biologically
attacked by another nation, it would most likely
be the one to request an investigation and could
be expected to cooperate fully. However, despite
the cooperative attitude of the host nation, its
vested interest in the outcome of the investiga-
tion requires the investigating team to be alert to
the possibility that information provided by
official sources may be biased, incomplete, or
even fraudulent.
Normally an outbreak suspected to be the
result of criminal or terrorist attack would be
investigated as a police matter by the country on
whose territory it took place. However, in some
instances, assistance under the protocol would be
requested, e.g., if the affected country did not597
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have sufficient resources to mount an investiga-
tion, or if state-sponsored terrorism were
suspected. Such investigations would also be
conducted in a cooperative climate.
Outbreaks thought to be the result of attack
by a nation on one of its own subnational groups
or the result of an accidental release of harmful
agents could lead to a request by one state party
for an investigation on the territory of another. If
the suspected nation is innocent of the
allegations, it might cooperate fully with the
investigating team. However, even for an
innocent party, considerations of national
sovereignty or concerns about revealing sensitive
information about internal matters might incline
the national government to oppose investigation
under a convention protocol. Even the simple
desire not to complicate an ongoing public health
investigation could lead to reluctance; for
example, the 1993 outbreak of hantavirus
pulmonary syndrome in the United States had
several highly suspicious features (7). Had the
protocol been in force at that time, a request for
an international on-site investigation, in parallel
with the ongoing investigation of the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, would have
been likely. The United States would probably
not have welcomed such a complication.
If the international community were to
proceed with an unwelcome investigation, it
would do so under decidedly uncooperative
conditions. This could complicate and even
compromise the investigation. Failure to cooper-
ate with the investigation would constitute a
violation of the protocol and could be interpreted
as confirming guilt, an incentive to give at least
the appearance of cooperation. The great
difficulties that the U.N. Special Commission had
performing facility inspections in Iraq with an
uncooperative government remind us that
actually implementing unwelcome investiga-
tions requires a daunting amount of political will
and persistence (17-19). However, the success of
the U.N. Special Commission in unearthing
details of Iraqi weapons programs, despite
failure of the Iraqi government to cooperate,
shows that such investigations can be worthwhile.
Who Decides If an
Outbreak Is Suspicious?
The negotiated protocol is expected to
establish the Organization for the Prohibition of
Biological Weapons, which will administer
certain aspects of the protocol, including
investigations. An executive council composed of
selected states parties to the protocol will
authorize all investigations. Only states parties
to the protocol will have standing to request an
investigation.
This restricted standing could present a
dilemma to public health professionals who
might conclude from their investigation that an
outbreak was deliberately instigated. For them, a
professional approach would be to convey their
suspicions and evidence to the organization
sponsoring the investigation (typically the World
Health Organization [WHO], a national or
subnational health organization, or a nongovern-
mental organization). However, if the respon-
sible organization is not willing to convey the
suspicions to the government or to the Organiza-
tion for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, the
public health experts may be in an awkward
position, fraught with conflicting professional,
political, and ethical responsibilities.
How a request from a state party for an
outbreak investigation would be handled by the
executive council is not yet clear. Existing
precedents in arms control treaties are either of
the “strong red light” or “strong green light”
types. Under a strong red light mechanism, once
a request is formally made, a substantial
majority of the executive council must vote to
oppose an investigation in order to stop it;
otherwise, the investigation goes forward. Under
a strong green light mechanism, once a request is
made formally, a substantial majority of the
executive council must vote in favor of an
investigation in order for it to proceed. Both
models raise concerns: the former because it may
not provide sufficient protection from nuisance
requests, and the latter because it may make
investigating truly suspicious outbreaks very
difficult if they are controversial.
The evidence brought to the executive council
to support a request for an investigation is likely
to be somewhat ambiguous, given the prevalence
of natural outbreaks of disease. Its evaluation is
thus not a trivial matter, and serious attention to
this issue is warranted; two levels of analysis
might be useful. First, the Organization for the
Prohibition of Biological Weapons might assist
the executive council by providing a technical
analysis of the evidence. The organization is
expected to have a staff of impartial experts in
epidemiology and weapons control issues,598
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qualified to evaluate technical evidence. Second,
each state party on the executive council should
have a mechanism in place for consulting with its
own experts on very short notice, since the
executive council vote is expected to be mandated
within a day of the request.
Sources of Information about
Suspicious Outbreaks
Investigation of most suspicious outbreaks
will be initiated by national or international
public health agencies. In many cases the results
of this initial public health investigation will
implicate the outbreak as suspicious and provide
the basis for a request for an investigation. The
evidence should not be expected to be conclusive;
however, it should provide reasonable grounds
for suspicion that the outbreak may involve
intentional or accidental release of prohibited
materials. The investigation itself, once ap-
proved, will have the role of gathering sufficient
additional evidence to decide if the suspicions are
correct.
This evidence is likely to include one or more
of the following: intelligence gathered by the
state party requesting the investigation, epide-
miologic data gathered by the state party
requesting the investigation, or epidemiologic
evidence gathered by an international organiza-
tion (e.g., WHO). Other evidence could include
recovered delivery devices and information
gathered by nongovernmental organizations.
Intelligence information can be relevant
when prohibited activities in a particular nation
are suspected of causing an outbreak, and the
intelligence directly addresses those activities.
However, intelligence commonly requires sub-
stantial redaction to protect sources and
capabilities, which can seriously compromise its
persuasiveness. Thus, intelligence is unlikely to
be a useful source of information for the executive
council, except under unusual circumstances.
Commonly, relevant information suggesting
that the outbreak is suspicious will be
epidemiologic and will be obtained by a national
or international health organization. If the
source is a national health organization, the
information can be expected to be freely available
if the requesting party is the one that performed
the investigation; if, however, a second party is
requesting an investigation in a country that is
unreceptive to it, the available information is
likely to be limited and unreliable. Even when
freely shared, epidemiologic information from an
interested party may not be complete and accurate.
Different problems are associated with
epidemiologic information gathered by an
international organization. Currently, for ex-
ample, WHO’s procedures prevent official release
of information not approved by the host country.
While permission to release information to the
executive council would be expected when the
host country and requesting country are the
same, such permission would be unlikely if the
host country opposed the investigation; never-
theless, the outlines of the results would likely be
widely known, given the rapid expansion of
epidemiologic information on the Internet (e.g.,
through ProMED Mail). However, the unavail-
ability of official information could be a serious
problem within the executive council, as it
provides a credible rationale for questioning
technical information.
As procedures are developed to share
information among health organizations and the
Organization for the Prohibition of Biological
Weapons, the implications for public health need
to be considered. The effectiveness of health
organizations could be compromised if nations
fear that a natural outbreak might be mistakenly
judged suspicious. International health organi-
zations will thus need to operate with great tact
and caution when they encounter a potentially
suspicious outbreak.
Finally, no matter how important the
resolution of suspicions of convention noncompli-
ance is, protecting ongoing public health
response to an outbreak is essential. Contain-
ment of the outbreak and prompt treatment of
patients cannot be compromised by a simulta-
neous arms control investigation.
Features of an Outbreak Investigation
under a Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention Protocol
Most scientific aspects of an outbreak
investigation in a Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention context are identical to those of a
comparable investigation in a public health
context. However, some striking differences
occur because of the international scope and the
quasi-forensic aspects of the investigation. While
it is probably possible under most circumstances
to discriminate between a natural (but unusual)
outbreak, and one that results from accident or
from intentional use (7), the acceptability of such599
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2To learn more about the protocol and how to have input into the process, interested scientists can contact their professional
organizations or nongovernmental organizations, such as the Federation of American Scientists (www.fas.org/bwc/), the
University of Bradford Department of Peace Studies (www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/), or the Monterey Institute of International
Studies (http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/).  All the relevant documents, including copies of the current rolling text of the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention protocol, can be downloaded from these sites.
conclusions in a political context requires a high
level of credibility.
The investigation’s team leader will need to
be a full-time member of the Organization for the
Prohibition of Biological Weapons, with experi-
ence in supervising epidemiologic investigations
and in handling the diplomatic issues of weapons
control compliance. This leader will have to
ensure scientific rigor, proper handling of
evidence, impartiality, and tactful handling of
publicity. Other members of the team will be
chosen for their relevant expertise from the
organization staff or a pre-approved list of
experts employed outside the organization.
The possibility of interference from the host
state makes it important that the team be as
independent as possible. This is particularly
critical for interpretative and translation ser-
vices, but applies as well to such areas as
communications, transportation, diagnostic re-
agents,  standards, analytic equipment, and
microbiologic media.  Failure to ensure such
independence may seriously compromise the
effectiveness of investigations. However, the
current draft protocol does not ensure indepen-
dence of communications and transportation.
Unlike more routine investigations where
sample tampering is not normally considered a
risk, investigations of suspicious outbreaks will
require strict documentation of the provenance
and chain-of-custody of all samples. Sample
analysis will require certifiably calibrated
analytic equipment and standardized reagents.
Such analysis should be done on-site or in
approved diagnostic laboratories. Internal stan-
dards, replicate analysis, and blind testing
should be used for the highest possible credibility
of results.
Most investigations can be expected to
overlap with ongoing public health investiga-
tions. There could thus be substantial difficulties
in coordinating the two, with their very different
goals and divergent requirements for sample
handling and analysis. Information sharing will
also be an issue, since both investigations need
access to all relevant information about the
outbreak, yet they must be independent.
Conclusions
For the public health community and their
colleagues in plant and animal epidemiology,
negotiating a protocol to the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention will establish formal
procedures for the investigation of certain
outbreaks. These procedures will have certain
elements, such as forensic standards for evidence
handling, that are generally not familiar to field
epidemiologists. However, the very formal
procedures will help insulate scientists from the
political dimensions of such investigations.
Nevertheless, several aspects of the ongoing
negotiations deserve the careful consideration of
public health organizations and practitioners, for
example, ways in which epidemiologic informa-
tion gathered during a public health investiga-
tion can be used to justify a weapons-control
investigation or to support or rebut the
conclusions of such an investigation. Addition-
ally, further consideration is needed about the
implications of public health investigations’
sharing personnel with highly politicized arms
control investigations, a consequence of the small
numbers of professionals with expertise in
relevant disciplines.
The negotiated weapons convention protocol
will improve security against biological attack.
However, the costs to routine public health
measures should be minimized to the greatest
extent possible. This will require continued
attention from both the arms control and the
public health communities. Negotiations on the
protocol are nearing the final stages in Geneva,
and there is no longer opportunity for technical
consideration to have much influence on the final
language. However, advice from public health
professionals will be needed as the detailed
operating procedures are developed to imple-
ment the necessarily general diplomatic lan-
guage of the new protocol. Such advice will be
important at both the international level, as the
Organization for the Prohibition of Biological
Weapons develops detailed operating proce-
dures, and at the national level, as each state
party implements legislation and domestic
operating procedures.2600
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